Title: Mior and Skyfall: Rogue Cloud Hosts Can Reach Inside AMD SEV-SNP Confidential VMs
Summary:
Two research teams published attacks this week against AMD SEV-SNP, the confidential-computing technology meant to keep a server’s operator out of tenant VMs on EPYC processors. Mior (CVE-2026-0462), from ETH Zurich and presented at ACM CCS 2026, exploits Infinity Fabric routing: with a BIOS left with its routing registers unlocked and control of the hypervisor, the attacker redirects the PSP’s SEV-SNP initialization writes to attacker-controlled PCIe device memory, so read-back checks pass while the Reverse Map Table entries that protect the RMP itself stay uninitialized. The hypervisor can then enable debugging on a production confidential VM and use the PSP’s debug commands to read and write its memory — the team showed this in all 1,000 attempts — and copy a benign VM’s launch measurement into a malicious one to forge valid attestation reports; demonstrated on a Zen 5 EPYC 9135 with SEV-SNP firmware API 1.58.4, with Zen 3 and Zen 4 potentially affected by the same code path. Skyfall (CVE-2026-40671), from ETH Zurich and Google (IEEE S&P 2027), is a transient-execution attack building on Transient Scheduler Attacks: an aborting VMRUN leaves a confidential VM’s decrypted register state in the L1 cache, which privileged software can sample to recover VMSA register values, an AES-XTS disk-encryption key, and guest memory at three fixed cache-line offsets (0x0c0, 0x380, 0x3c0); it also recovers decrypted microcode patches on Zen 3 and Zen 4 and SMM state including SMBASE, CR3 and R13 with 100 percent accuracy. AMD’s response arrives through two advisories that assign different fixes: updated SEV firmware, dated August 12, addresses Mior, while Skyfall’s remedy from the same date is processor microcode, with platform firmware for server makers targeted for November (Skyfall) and December (Mior) — so confidential-VM tenants depend on their host provider applying BIOS updates, with no workaround listed. Both attacks stay inside AMD’s declared SEV-SNP threat model (untrusted hypervisor and firmware), neither team reports real-world exploitation, and Mior’s disclosure to AMD on February 12, 2026 ended with embargo lift on November 10, 2026.
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